In the wake of September 11, the safety of civilian nuclear power plants against terrorist attacks and the security of nuclear materials, technology and expertise in the former Soviet Union have aroused acute concerns among scientists, policymakers and the public. The threat posed by biological weapons, the so-called “poor man’s nuke,” has also gained urgent attention following a rash of anthrax mailings. Nuclear and biological materials are now more available on the black market than ever before.

The Fifth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – the first international treaty banning an entire class of weapons – has just concluded in Geneva. What the BWC embraces in spirit, it lacks in enforcement, for the treaty lacks any means of verifying and monitoring compliance.

And questions linger about U.S. compliance with the bio-weapons ban after American rejection of proposed laboratory inspections. The pharmaceutical industry opposes such inspections, arguing that secrets can be stolen in the process. In July, the chief U.S. negotiator at monitoring talks admitted to Congress that government agencies conduct “ambiguous biological activities.” Two weeks later, he stunned delegates to the Fifth Review Conference by rejecting a draft monitoring and enforcement protocol.

Independent analysts and world leaders alike believe that a biological weapons enforcement regime and other preventive measures would fill a major gap in global security arrangements. Until now, nuclear terrorism has been deemed unlikely as it would trigger an overwhelming international backlash. But with a new breed of “non-traditional” terrorists, those fail-safes are no longer reliable. Preventing clandestine nuclear and biological arms races is a primary responsibility of the entire international community.

What are the real threats, and where are they coming from? How do we protect ourselves from real threats and avoid being distracted by hoaxes? Why does the U.S. refuse to open our own commercial and military plants to inspection while demanding it of others? And what do they propose instead?